Recent studies reported that the attraction effect, whereby inferior decoys cause choice reversals, 19 fails to replicate if the choice options are presented in a pictorial rather than abstract numerical 20 form. We argue that the pictorial setting makes the similarity between decoy and target salient, 21 while the abstract one emphasizes the inferiority relationship between them, crucial for the effect 22 to occur. Thus, we used a novel experimental design in which both similarity and inferiority are 23 equally easy to judge, their relative strength simple to manipulate, and choices incentivized 24 rather than hypothetical. Using eye-tracking, we found that both the transfer of attention towards 25 an undesirable target and choice reversal likelihood increase when the decoy is more strongly 26 inferior but less similar to the target. This suggests that a key mechanism in the attraction effect 27 is that, by virtue of its inferiority, a decoy projects a spotlight of attention towards the target, 28 making it more attractive. 29 KEYWORDS: eye-tracking; choice reversal; attraction effect 30 31 2 One of the most prominent context effects in consumer choice is the attraction effect 32 (Huber, Payne, & Puto, 1982) . This occurs when choosing between different options, say A and 33 B, each of which is better than the other in some respects. Adding a third option, C ('decoy'), 34 that is in every respect worse than B ('target'), but still in some respects better than A 35 ('competitor'), makes people more likely to choose B, even if they would have preferred A to B 36 in the absence of C. 37
to occur. Thus, we used a novel experimental design in which both similarity and inferiority are 23 equally easy to judge, their relative strength simple to manipulate, and choices incentivized 24 rather than hypothetical. Using eye-tracking, we found that both the transfer of attention towards 25 an undesirable target and choice reversal likelihood increase when the decoy is more strongly 26 inferior but less similar to the target. This suggests that a key mechanism in the attraction effect 27 is that, by virtue of its inferiority, a decoy projects a spotlight of attention towards the target, 28 making it more attractive. were actually affected by decoys (that is, it is impossible to tell if a subject would choose 70 differently from a given competitor-target pair in the absence of a decoy). 71
To address the above problem, similarly to Hedgcock, Rao, and Chen (2016), we used a 72 repeated-measures design, in which subjects face each competitor-target combination both with 73 and without a decoy (separated by other decision trials as well as distractor tasks). However, 74
unlike any existing studies, we combined this type of a repeated-measures design with eye-75 tracking. To illustrate the purpose of this setup, consider the two-attribute choice problem 76 depicted in Figure 1 . Suppose that we have established that a given participant prefers option 'c' 77 present the participant with the same choice, but with a decoy that is slightly inferior but very 79 similar to the target ('d1') would it result in a greater transfer of visual attention from the 80 competitor ('c') to the target ('t') than if we instead used a decoy that is highly inferior but not 81 very similar to the target ('d2')? 82
[ Figure 1 about here] 83
The above question is all the more important given that it can be linked to the recent 84 debate about the robustness of the attraction effect. In particular, the authors of two extensive 85 replication projects have argued that the effect is only reproduced if the choice options are 86 presented as combinations of abstract numerical attributes, but fails to occur under a more 87 realistic, pictorial representation (Frederick, Lee, & Baskin, 2014; Yang & Lynn, 2014) . We 88 believe that the reason for the discrepancy is that the numerical representation makes the 89 inferiority relationship between the decoy and the target salient, as it is easy for subjects to notice 90 that one is worse than the other in terms of, for example, both the quality index and the price. In 91 contrast, displaying options as pictures typically emphasizes the similarity between decoy and 92 target -in most stimuli examples presented in the two replication studies it is immediately clear 93 that two of the three options may be perceived as a group, e.g. one gets to choose between two 94 very similarly packaged varieties of the same brand of popcorn and one visually distinct product 95 of another brand. At the same time, as noted by Simonson (2014) , this makes it very hard for 96 subjects to tell which option in the pictorial replication studies is the dominated, inferior one, 97 whereas, according to Huber, Payne, and Puto (2014) 'attraction depends on the ability to 98 identify the dominance relationship quickly and unambiguously'. Even in those pictorial 99 replications in which inferiority is clear (e.g. displaying pictures of an orange, a fresh apple, and 100
Based on the discussed abstract vs. pictorial discrepancy reported by recent studies, we 114 hypothesized that introducing a decoy inferior to an option one did not choose in decoy's 115 absence will transfer attention (measured by eye fixation duration) to the target from the 116 competitor (that is, a greater proportion of the fixation time will be allocated to an unattractive 117 target if a decoy dominated by that target is added to the choice set). However, this effect will be 118 weaker if the decoy is more similar but less inferior to the target ('d1' in Figure 1 , as opposed to 119 'd2'). If confirmed, such a result would indicate that the attentional spotlight cast on the target by 120 virtue of its superiority rather than similarity to the decoy is strong enough to offset the natural 121 tendency to perceive spatially close/similar objects as a group and divert more attention towards 122 them (Kimchi, Yeshurun, Spehar, & Pirkner, 2016) . 123 such an approach might be useful in the evaluation of real-world marketing strategies. 130
131

Method 132
Subjects 133
The experiment was carried out at a large private university, where a total of 68 134 undergraduate and postgraduate student subjects were recruited. Their average age was 21.88 135 (SD = 3.18), 39 of them were female, and all had normal or corrected to normal eyesight. 136
Stimuli and Design 137
Subjects repeatedly chose (without time limit) one out of two or one out of three bundles 138 of two types of goods: (1) shopping vouchers redeemable at any store of a big supermarket 139 chain, including a store located in the vicinity of the experiment location; (2) food and drink 140 vouchers redeemable at the local university canteen. All monetary values stated below are in the 141 local currency, a unit of which is worth approximately 0.3 USD. For instance, in a given choice 142 trial a subject might be asked to choose one of the following two bundles: (1) a supermarket 143 voucher worth 4 and a canteen voucher worth 16; or (2) a supermarket voucher worth 14 and a 144 canteen voucher worth 8. 145 setting was partly inspired by a typical retailer's taxonomical shelf design, where products that 147 are more similar are located closer together, but where it is equally simple to locate products that 148 are inferior in quality or price (e.g. basic, low-quality products are placed in the bottom shelves). 149 This is known to facilitate the consumers' evaluation of the products and increases their 150 Accordingly, in our case, the subjects' assessment of both similarity and inferiority was 152 facilitated by presenting the voucher bundles on a spatial grid, where each 'disk' corresponds to 153 a single bundle. In the example in Figure 2 , its X-axis position (or the number in the left half of 154 the disk) represents the value of the supermarket voucher included in the bundle, and the Y-axis 155 position is the value of the included canteen voucher. Thus, one bundle was inferior to another if 156 positioned to the bottom left of it, while similarity was simple to judge based on proximity. 157
As explained in the 'Payoffs' section, our subjects were motivated to reveal their true 158 preferences. As such, they were unlikely to be biased by the visual presentation of the choice 159 options, with the grid only there to support their assessment of the relationships between them 160 (as shown by existing research, visual decision support tools can help people during multi-161 attribute choice, see e.g. Samek, Hur, Kim, & Yi, 2016) . 162
Nevertheless, to counterbalance potential artefacts associated with the relative positioning 163 of the choice options, for half of the subjects the canteen and supermarket voucher values were 164 instead indicated by the X and Y axis respectively (as expected, we found no difference between 165 the two groups of subjects). Furthermore, as detailed later, the relative positioning of the choice 166 options was included as an independent variable in the regression model (rather than held 167 constant across trials) allowing us to control and investigate its effect on attention and choices. 168 example bundle, randomly generated in each instance of the task to additionally obstruct any 173 attempts at memorizing the previous choice options). The purpose of the distractor task was to 174 avoid carryover memory/learning effects and psychological reactivity (Ahn, Kim, & Ha, 2015; 175
Hutchinson, Kamakura, & Lynch, 2000), by removing the primary task (choice-related) 176 information from short-term memory (Bjork & Whitten, 1974) . 177
[ Figure 3 about here] 178
Choice Trial Specification 179
In each of the first 30 trials of the experiment, each subject would choose one of two 180 bundles. The composition of each pair of bundles was drawn randomly subject to a number of 181 constraints. That is, we considered all pairs of bundles such that: a) one bundle in each pair 182 included a higher-value canteen voucher than the other, which in turn included a higher value 183 supermarket voucher; b) the value of each type of voucher included in each bundle was at least 4 184 (to allow for an inferior bundle to be added later -see below) but at most 18, and was a 185 multitude of 2 (consistent with the resolution of the grid, and to allow for enough distance 186 between the areas of interest). We drew the pairs of bundles randomly from this set, 187 independently for each subject and without replacement (ensuring that no choice sets were 188 duplicate within subjects). We treated the first three trials obtained in this way as training, 189 familiarizing subjects with the problem. 190 by adding a third, decoy bundle to the original two. The decoy was set randomly on each 192 occasion, but always inferior to one (and only one) of the other two bundles (target). That is, the 193 decoy was drawn from the set of bundles which: a) contained strictly less of one type of voucher 194 and no more of the other type of voucher than one of the existing two bundles (the target), but 195 strictly more of one type of voucher (and strictly less of the other type) than the competitor; b) 196 contained at least 2 but at most 16 of each type of voucher (a multitude of 2). In the example 197 shown in Figure 2 , the matching trial would include a decoy located either north of bundle 2 but 198 to the south-west of bundle 1, or east of bundle 1 and to the south-west of bundle 2. 199
The 27 matching trials were scheduled after the initial trials, in a randomized order. The 200 reason for this relative timing of the two blocks was that, in the first instance, we wished to elicit 201 each subject's genuine preference between the competitor and the target without any current or 202 past exposure to decoys. At the same time, in the 'Results' section we report that the distractor 203 tasks were apparently successful in eliminating the influence of subjects' potential recollections 204 of the initial trials on their behavior and attention patterns in the matching trials, i.e. the ordering 205 of the blocks was unlikely to interfere with our study of choice reversals in the matching trials. 206
Payoffs 207
Subjects were told that, upon completion, they would receive a single voucher bundle, 208 drawn randomly from the set of the bundles they selected throughout all trials. This kind of 209 random lottery payoff mechanism is often used, as it is effective in preventing portfolio building 210 strategies and ensuring the independence of actions across trials, while allowing for 'real-world 211 consequences' of choices (Cubitt, Starmer, & Sugden, 1998) . On average, subjects received an 212 equivalent of 7 USD in vouchers, and the whole study took 25 minutes to complete (including 213 the reading of instructions, eye-tracking calibration, and the distractor tasks).
we identified the eye fixations that occurred between displaying the choice screen and the subject 218 submitting the choice (a fixation is a pause of eye movement on any part of the visual field, 219
representing the subject's gaze being fixed on a specific point on the screen; see the appendix for 220 details of the fixation detection procedure). We computed the total duration (in milliseconds) of 221 all fixations directed at each of the disks representing the available choices. Henceforth, by 222 'attention to option X' we mean the total duration of fixations directed at the disk representing X. 223
For each pair of matched trials (the initial trial and its later matching trial including a decoy), we 224 identified the bundle that was chosen (preferred) in the initial trial -let 'P' denote this bundle, and 225 let 'NP' denote the other bundle, the one that was not chosen (preferred) in the initial trial. 226 Accordingly, we calculated the value of a variable we term 'attention reversal' (between the two 227 trials), defined as follows: 228 log [ attention to NP in the matching trial attention to P in the matching trial ⁄ attention to NP in the initial trial attention to P in the initial trial ⁄ ] 229
Thus, attention reversal is positive when more attention is allocated to NP relative to P in 230 the matching trial compared with the initial trial, and negative if the opposite occurs (the log-231 ratio transformation is used to normalize the comparison outcome). In other words, the greater 232 the shift of attention between the initial and matching trial -away from the option chosen in the 233
To determine the potential role of the decoy in attention reversal, for each pair of 237 matched trials we also specified the following two variables: 238
(1) 'target-preferred', a binary variable, taking a value 1 if the target option in the matching trial 239 was P, i.e. if the decoy was set inferior to the more preferred option; if this was not the case, the 240 variable took a value 0 241
(2) 'proximity-to-target', a continuous variable, equal to the difference between the Euclidean 242 distance between the decoy and the competitor and a similar distance between the decoy and the 243 target (using a log-ratio of the two distances instead does not cause a qualitative change of the 244 results; also note that the reason why the two distances are not considered as separate variables is 245 because it is impossible to change one without changing the other, and due to their strong 246 negative correlation including both in a regression model would cause multicollinearity). 247
Lastly, an alternative dependent variable that we used in a separate model was 'choice 248 reversal' (between the matching and initial trial). This was a binary variable taking a value 1 if in 249 the matching trial the subject chose the bundle she did not choose in the initial trial (otherwise, it 250 took a value 0). Such choice reversals occurred in 19% of matched trial-pairs. 251
Checking for memory carryover effects 252
To begin with, we wanted to check if our distractor task was successful in removing any 253 carryover memory effects, i.e. if the subjects' behavior in the matching trials was not influenced 254 by their previous exposure to the corresponding initial trials. To this end, we estimated a mixed-255 effects binary logistic regression model in which each pair of matched trials by a given subject 256 constituted a single observation, with random intercept and slope effects clustered by subject to 257 allow for correlated errors. The dependent variable was 'choice reversal', and the sole 258 independent variable was the number of trials separating the initial trial from its matching trial. 259
We found no significant effect between the two variables (β = -0.004, t = -0.522, p = .602) 260
suggesting that a reduced time difference between the two matched trials did not significantly 261 increase the likelihood that a subject's choice would be the same in both of them. In fact, the 262 same was true for the relationship between the time difference and attention reversal (β = 0.002, 263 t = 0.829, p = .407). 264
The influence of inferiority vs. similarity on attention reversal 265
Following this initial check, we proceeded to the main focus of our investigation, namely 266 the effect of 'target-preferred' and 'proximity-to-target' on attention reversal. As a prelude to the 267 main analysis, Table 1 shows the average attention reversal depending on the values of the two 268 independent variables in question. In general, attention reversal tends to be positive on average, 269 possibly due to the presence of the decoy distorting the attentional bias towards the preferred 270 option in the initial trial. However, it appears that the difference between the attention transfer 271 when target-preferred = 1, compared with target-preferred = 0, increases with proximity-to-272 target. This would suggest that the attention transfer to the less preferred option brought about by 273 targeting it, rather than the more preferred option, with an inferior decoy, is greater when the 274 decoy is more strongly inferior but less similar to the target (in fact, for high proximity-to-target, 275
we observe a 'repulsion effect' of the decoy instead of attraction). 276
To evaluate the statistical significance of the above effects of the way in which the decoy 277 is set, we estimated a mixed-effects linear regression model, again with each pair of matched 278 subject to allow for correlated errors. The dependent variable was now 'attention reversal', and 280 the independent variables were the 'target-preferred' and 'proximity-to-target' variables 281 described above (as well as their interaction). We dropped those pairs of matched trials in which 282 either: a) the subject selected the decoy bundle in the matching trial (2% of trial pairs); b) 283 fixations were not recorded in at least one of the two matched trials due to a technical 284 malfunction, looking away from the screen, blinking etc. (a further 9% of trial pairs); or c) the 285 subject only looked at one of the available options in either of the matched trials, making it 286 impossible to calculate the value of attention reversal (10% of trial pairs; clipping the log-ratio 287 values instead of dropping these trial pairs does not cause a qualitative change of the results). 288
The fixed effects estimation results (based on robust covariances) are presented in Table 2 . 289
[ Table 2 about here] 290
The fact that the model intercept is significantly positive (β=0.702, p<.001) indicates that, when 291 the decoy is inferior to the 'less preferred' option (not chosen in the initial trial) and equally 292 distant from the target and the competitor (target-preferred = proximity-to-target = 0), then in the 293 matching trial subjects allocate more attention to the less preferred option (relative to the more 294 preferred one) compared with the initial trial. In other words, a decoy equally similar to both 295 options, but inferior to the less preferred one, causes a transfer of attention towards it. 296
The significantly negative coefficient estimate of 'target-preferred' (β=-0.724, p<0.001) 297 means that making the decoy inferior to the more preferred option (instead of the less preferred 298 one), but keeping its distance from the (new) target similar to the distance from the competitor 299 (low proximity-to-target), results in a greater proportion of attention being allocated to the more 300 attention-reversal towards the less preferred option becomes (slightly) negative. This suggests 302 that, given a low proximity-to-target, attention only transfers towards the less preferred option if 303 the decoy is inferior to it rather than to the more preferred option. 304
Most importantly, the significantly negative estimate of 'proximity-to-target' (β=-0.082, 305 p=0.002) indicates that, when the decoy is inferior to the less preferred option (target-preferred = 306 0), then the smaller the extent to which it is inferior (and hence the more similar / closer to the 307 target it is relative to competitor), the smaller the transfer of attention towards the (less preferred) 308 target option. Accordingly, the significantly positive estimate of the 'target-preferred*proximity-309 to-target' interaction term (β=0.135, p=.006) indicates that the attention transfer to the less 310 preferred option brought about by targeting it, rather than the more preferred option, with an 311 inferior decoy, is greater when the decoy is more strongly inferior but less similar to the target. 312
This tendency can also be seen in Table 4 , preceded by the 321 raw frequencies of choice reversal (depending on the two independent variables) shown in Table  322 3. 323
[ In analogy with attention reversal, it seems from Table 3 that the frequency of choice  326 reversal decreases with proximity-to-target when target-preferred = 0 but (in almost all cases) 327 increases with proximity-to-target when target-preferred = 1. Consequently, the difference 328 between the frequency of choice reversal when target-preferred = 1 vs. when target-preferred = 0 329 increases with proximity-to-target. This would suggest that the increase in the likelihood of 330 choosing the less preferred option brought about by targeting it, rather than the more preferred 331 option, with an inferior decoy, is greater when the decoy is more strongly inferior but less similar 332 to the target. 333
Similarly, the regression coefficient estimates shown in Table 4 are all significant and 334 (apart from the intercept) have the same signs as those in Table 2 1 . Specifically, we find that, 335 when the decoy is set inferior to the less preferred option (target-preferred = 0), then the smaller 336 the extent to which it is inferior (and hence the larger 'proximity-to-target'), the smaller the 337 chance of a choice reversal (β=-0.396, p<.001). Additionally, the significantly positive estimate 338 of the 'target-preferred*proximity-to-target' interaction (β=0.636, p<.001) indicates that the 339 increase in choice reversal likelihood brought about by targeting it, rather than the more 340 1 Note that the fact that the intercept is not significantly different from zero simply means that the probability of choice reversal when target-preferred = proximity-to-target = 0 is not significantly different from ½. As the link function is different in each case and 'zero' has a different interpretation, this (null) result does not mean that the current relationship is not consistent with the one estimated in Table 2. preferred option, with an inferior decoy, is greater when the decoy is more strongly inferior but 341 less similar to the target. 342
Given the apparent link between the properties of the decoy on one hand and both 343 attention and choices on the other, it seems natural to consider a model in which both attention 344 reversal and choice reversal are present at the same time. For example, one might wonder 345 whether attention reversal mediates the relationship between the decoy and choice reversal 346 demonstrated in Table 4 . However, apart from the technical difficulties of carrying out a 347 mediation analysis within a mixed-model with a continuous mediator and a binary outcome 348 variable, the complex, bi-directional nature of the attention-choice link we mentioned in the 349 introduction is what prevents us from doing so. In particular, it is likely that the properties of the 350 decoy affect, in the first instance, both attention to the choice options and a latent preference 351 towards them. At the same time, the emerging preference is bound to influence attention, and 352 vice versa, until a choice is finally made according to the preference at the time. 353
In Table 5 , we present an auxiliary regression, which differs from the one in Table 4 in 354 one feature only -namely that attention-reversal is included as an independent variable. As 355 expected, this suggests a positive link between attention-reversal and preference-reversal 356 (βattention-reversal = 1.956, p<.001), while the other coefficient estimates are similar to those in Table  357 4. Although this might suggest that attention does not mediate the link between the decoy and 358 choices, one should interpret the results of the model in Table 5 with caution, due to the fact that 359 attention-reversal and choice-reversal may be co-determined by the latent preference variable 360 that is omitted from the model, and the resulting endogeneity problem could bias the regression 361 estimates. 362 believe that our results so far suggest that the link between them could potentially be exploited 364 for predictive purposes. In particular, we now explore the possibility of predicting, based on 365 attention to the choice options in the matching trial, whether or not a choice reversal has taken 366 place. 367
Detecting choice reversals based on eye-data 368
Our aim here was to check if it is possible to use eye-data to detect choice reversals ex-369 post, i.e. to determine whether or not a subject who chose the target did so because of or 370 regardless of the decoy. While not central to our hypothesis regarding the attentional mechanism 371 underlying the attraction effect, this analysis could have important practical implications. If 372 successful, it would indicate, for example, that online retailers might in the future use their 373 customers' increasingly easy to obtain eye-data (e.g. from smartphone cameras) to determine if 374 decoys that they deployed actually change the choices of individual consumers. For example, 375 suppose that a retailer wants to establish which 'types' of consumers (say, those who spent a lot 376 at its online store in the past vs. those who did not) are most susceptible to the attraction effect 377 and can be influenced by decoys. Suppose further that a similar fraction of consumers in each 378 group who were exposed to decoys have nevertheless opted for the competitor options, i.e. were 379 clearly not influenced. However, those 'low-spenders' who chose the target tended to focus their 380 attention on it while ignoring the decoy and the competitor. In contrast, the 'high-spenders' who 381 chose the target tended to look at the competitor and the decoy a lot more. Should the retailer 382 conclude that both groups were similarly influenced by the decoy, or perhaps the 'high-spenders' 383 were more strongly influenced but also liked the target options less in the first place, giving rise 384 to a similar overall proportion of target purchases? While such questions could eventually be 385 answered by continued experimentation with product offerings and analysing the aggregate sales, 386 using eye-data could potentially help to more quickly determine which individual consumers' 387 choices were successfully altered. 388
With such practical applications in mind, we wished to verify if the prediction of choice 389 reversals from attention measures can be done 'out of sample', based on a model estimated on data 390 obtained from other people (e.g. through market research). Hence, we conducted a cross-validation 391 procedure using data from those matching trials in which the target was chosen. 392
To predict choice reversals, we used a mixed effects logistic regression model with 393 random subject intercept, 'choice reversal' as a dependent variable, and the proportional 394 attention to the competitor and target (computed as a fraction of total fixation time) being the two 395 independent variables (the proportional attention to decoy was thus redundant and not included). 396
In Table 6 , we report the model estimated for the entire sample of 68 subjects. This indicates that 397 increased attention to the competitor (not chosen by the subject) is associated with an increased 398 likelihood that the competitor has been chosen in the initial trial, i.e. that a choice reversal has 399 taken place (βattention-to-competitor = 8.085, p = .001). However, this effect is weaker when attention 400 to the chosen target bundle is larger, which means, for a given attention-to-competitor, that 401 attention to the decoy is smaller (βattention-to-competitor*attention-to-target = -6.935, p = .048). In other 402 words, the choice is more likely to have been altered by the decoy when attention to both the 403 decoy and the competitor is large, perhaps indicating a preference for the competitor that is 404 'suppressed' by the decoy. 405
Moving on to the actual cross-validation procedure, for each subject, we estimated the 406 same model as the one in Table 6 , but using data from the remaining 67 subjects. In each case, 407
we then used the model to estimate the choice reversal likelihood in the choice trials of the one 408 subject whose data we set aside. 409
Having saved the cross-validated regression scores estimated for each subject, we then 410 conducted a signal detection analysis to evaluate the overall out-of-sample predictive power. In 411 particular, for each cross-validation fold, we computed a receiver operating characteristic curve 412 (ROC) that combines all possible false positive -sensitivity pairs (points) that would obtain 413 depending on where we set the threshold value of choice reversal likelihood estimated by the 414 regression model above which a prediction of a choice reversal is made. For instance, a retailer 415 may take a 'liberal' approach and judge as effective all those decoys it used where the estimated 416 choice reversal likelihood is not extremely low. In contrast, a 'conservative' retailer might stop 417 using all decoys that do not achieve a high choice reversal likelihood. The total area under the 418 ROC ('AUC') is a measure of the overall signal detection power, and the overall potential of 419 eye-data to inform such decisions across all possible threshold values. Formally, the AUC is 420 equivalent to the probability that the likelihood of choice reversal estimated for a randomly 421 chosen trial in which choice reversal occurs is higher than for a randomly chosen trial in which it 422 does not occur, and it is also equal to the value of the corresponding Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 423 test statistic. 424
In our case, we found the mean AUC to be equal to 0.62, with a 95% Confidence Interval 425
[.579; .663], obtained using the method of computing confidence intervals for cross-validated 426 AUC estimates for pooled repeated measures data sets developed by LeDell, Petersen, and van 427 der Laan (2015). Thus, the mean AUC was significantly above the chance level of 0.5 (whereby 428 a choice reversal is predicted by chance in a given fixed proportion of cases). The present experiment combined eye-tracking and real economic consequences of 438 choices in a spatial grid design that allowed subjects to identify and assess both similarity and 439 inferiority relationships between choice options with similar ease. The relative strength of these 440 two relationships could be quantified, manipulated, and was included in the regression models as 441 an explanatory variable. The aim was to investigate whether the failure to replicate the attraction 442 effect under pictorial rather than abstract choice visualization could be explained by the fact that 443 the abstract choice presentation makes the inferiority relationship between the decoy and target 444 salient, while the pictorial presentation emphasizes their similarity. 445 We found that attention is transferred from one's more preferred choice option to the less 446 preferred one if a decoy option is set inferior to the less preferred option (rather than the more 447 preferred one). Crucially, this transfer of attention was stronger when the decoy was less similar 448 and hence more inferior relative to the target, suggesting that inferiority rather than similarity is 449 key for the attentional spotlight effect to occur. 450
What makes this result particularly compelling is that the spatial grid presentation of 451 choices made similarity easy to perceive by virtue of it being represented by visual proximity. 452
Existing eye-tracking research suggests that objects that are close to each other are more likely to 453 be seen as a group and tend to attract more attention (Kimchi et al., 2016) . Thus, one would 454 expect a greater transfer of attention to the target if the decoy is more similar and closer to it. The 455 fact that a significant opposite tendency occurs indicates that the 'attentional spotlight' due to the 456 decoy's inferiority to the target must be strong, as we see decoys that are further away but more 457 inferior to the target result in more attention being allocated to the latter. 458
Importantly, the decoy-induced transfer of attention seems well aligned with choice 459 reversals, as we found that these are more likely if a decoy is set inferior to one's less preferred 460 option but further away from it, so that it is less similar but more inferior relative to the target. In 461 other words, the circumstances that increase the attentional transfer also make choice reversals 462 more likely. 463
It has been argued that the attraction effect might not replicate due to the heterogeneity of 464 subjects' preferences artificially reducing its aggregate measures in between-subject designs 465 (Simonson, 2014) . For instance, some people might be repulsed rather than attracted by the 466 decoy, while others might be unaffected due to strong preferences (Farmer, Our use of eye-tracking combined with mixed-models addresses these issues and demands in two 472 ways. First, the fact that we obtain significant results while allowing for random intercept and 473 slope effects suggests that the overall effect of the decoy's similarity vs. inferiority to target is 474 strong relative to the between-subject variation in this respect. In other words, the overall effect 475 is significant even after accounting for subject heterogeneity. Additionally, thanks to the 476 vs. inferiority on both attention and choice. We found that these effects are considerable, ranging 479 from an attraction towards the target for low proximity to target, to 'repulsion' at the other 480 extreme (see Table 1 and Table 3 , as well as Frederick et al., 2014) . 481
To further underline the link between attention and choice reversal, we also wished to 482 investigate if it is possible to predict if a decoy actually induced a change in a subject's 483 preferences in a given matching trial in which a target was chosen, based solely on how the 484 subject visually examined the available options. In other words, on the basis of how attention 485 was distributed between the decoy, the target and the competitor, we would like to predict if the 486 target has been selected because of or irrespective of the decoy, i.e. if the target would also have 487 been chosen had the decoy been absent. 488
The reason why we thought that this might be possible is as follows. If the decoy was set 489 inferior to the subject's preferred option (i.e. there was no choice reversal), then it would have 490 only reinforced the subject's tendency to look at the chosen target bundle as the more attractive 491 option. In contrast, if the target was the less preferred option (i.e. a choice reversal occurred), 492 then the decoy would have artificially inflated attention to the target, but attention to the option 493 that was not chosen might still be substantial due to it being the subject's more preferred bundle. 494
Thus, we would expect attention to the option that was not chosen to have been higher in case of 495 choice reversal than in those cases when it does not occur, and this should make it possible to 496 'diagnose' choice reversals from eye-data. 497
Indeed, following a cross-validation procedure, we obtained an 'out-of-sample' 498 classification accuracy that was significantly above chance. This further points to the role of 499 attention in choice reversal, since, given a set of options and an observed choice, the way in 500 which attention was distributed is indicative of whether the choice in question has been affected 501 by the decoy option. It is also a fact that could, in the future, be used in the evaluation of the 502 effectiveness of decoys deployed as marketing tools. Similarly, or in further research of context 503 effects. 504
Scope and Limitations 505
Despite the novelty of using eye-tracking and non-hypothetical choices to study the 506 attraction effect, we must acknowledge certain limitations in the extent to which the results 507 would generalize beyond the present experimental framework. In particular, our presentation of 508 the choice trials as a spatial grid was different from both the abstract numerical and the pictorial 509 presentation used in previous studies. We thought that the spatial grid might, from the subjects' 510 point of view, resemble a real-world retail setting in which goods are arranged on shelves with 511 similar products located close together. Nevertheless, one might argue that similarity measured 512 as the distance in the space of product attributes is not the same as one between, say, a fresh vs. a 513 spoiled apple (i.e., as in the studies with pictorial presentation). The fact that, in our setting, 514 similarity is correlated with visual proximity could potentially cause artefacts, such as attention 515 switching from decoy to target merely due to the ease of transferring gaze over a short distance, 516 or indeed result in eye fixations on the decoy being incorrectly registered as ones on a similar 517 and spatially close target. Fortunately, the effect we have found is in the opposite direction, with 518 more attention on the target registered when the decoy is further away from it. Nevertheless, 519 future research might verify if it would still persist if the choice options were presented in a more 520 conventional manner, which would have the additional advantage of facilitating comparisons 521 with previous literature. 522 choose without and then with a decoy being present. This was to identify their 'true' preference, 524 undistorted by any current or previous exposure to decoys. However, it may have been that the 525 initial binary choice in some way influenced the choice in the later, matching trial, despite the 526 presence of the distractor tasks. 527
Similarly, the subjects may have noticed a pattern in the matching trials, where one of the 528 options (decoy) was always inferior compared to the target, potentially generating experimenter 529 demand effects (though the chance of this happening is reduced by the fact that the choices were 530 incentivized, and whether the experimenter would demand a choice of the target or the 531 competitor could not have been apparent to subjects). These problems could be addressed in 532 future research, perhaps via more unobtrusive, indirect ways of establishing preferences. Our 533 results on detecting choice reversals from eye-data could provide some guidance as to how this 534 might be achieved. 535
Overall, our results are consistent with and shed light on the abstract vs. pictorial 536 discrepancy reported by previous studies, which may indeed be due to the abstract representation 537 of the choice options making the inferiority relationship between decoy and target salient, and 538 the pictorial one highlighting their similarity instead, thus weakening the attraction effect. On the 539 other hand, the fact that inferiority rather than similarity is crucial for the attentional spotlight In particular, we found that a decoy does indeed draw attention towards its target and 557 away from the competitor, but that this effect is reduced as the decoy becomes more similar and 558 hence less strongly inferior relative to the target. We also found that the same circumstances also 559 reduce the choice reversal likelihood. 560
Our results suggest that it is the inferiority, rather than similarity of the decoy to target 561 which drives the attraction effect. This could help explain the discrepancy of results in studies 562 with abstract vs. pictorial representation of the choice options, because the former makes 563 inferiority salient, while the latter tends to emphasize similarity. 564
To further underline the link between choice reversal and attention, we showed that, 565 based on how a person looked at the available options, it is possible to predict if the presence of 566 the decoy influenced the observed choice. This suggests that eye-data could be used in the 567 assessment of marketing strategies and in the further research of context effects. The stimulus presentation software was programmed in Wolfram Mathematica. Each subject was 617 seated at a computer terminal, operating Microsoft Windows 8, with a 15.4-inch screen with 618 resolution set to 1280x720, and a SensoMotoric Instruments RED250 mobile eye-tracking device 619 attached underneath the screen and set to 250Hz frequency. Prior to the commencement of the 620 study, we conducted a standard five-point semi-automatic calibration and validation procedure 621 (the average deviation was below 0.5° for all subjects). Each trial was preceded by a fixation 622 cross, and subjects chose their preferred choice option using keyboard or mouse. A headrest was 623 used to stabilize the head position and ensure that the distance between the subject's eyes and the 624 device was approximately 65cm. We used the SMI Vision high-speed fixation detection 625 algorithm with standard settings (minimum fixation duration = 50ms, peak saccade velocity 626 
